This paper proposes a detailed mechanism for why exporting rms may have a lower emission intensity when emissions are subject to an environmental tax. This mechanism of our model is supported by Swedish rm-level data. Our mechanism runs through rms' endogenous investments in abatement. Firms' abatement investments depend on their production volumes, since a larger scale allows them to spread the xed costs of abatement investment across more units. Production volumes increase in rm productivity and, as a consequence, rms' emission intensity is negatively related to rm productivity. Exporting also leads to higher production volumes and thereby to a lower emission intensity. Thus, trade has an eect on emissions independently of rm productivity. Trade therefore leads to higher but cleaner production. The overall eect of trade on emissions is neutral in our model. Trade liberalization does not aect aggregate emissions in our benchmark case of symmetric countries. 
Introduction
There is no consensus on the eect of international trade on the environment, in particular on the eect of trade on global emissions. Neither the theoretical nor the empirical literature provides a clean cut answer to the link between trade and environmental emissions. International trade has opposing eects in neoclassical models. On the one hand, trade increases income, which will tend to increase the demand for a clean environment and therefore increase investments in clean technology and abatement. On the other hand, trade liberalization may also imply an overall expansion of dirty production, because trade allows countries with low emission standards to become pollution havens. Copeland and Taylor (1995) show how trade liberalization may increase global emissions if the income dierences between the liberalizing countries are large, as dirty industries are likely to expand strongly in the poor country with low environmental standards. Hence, we do not know if international trade increases or decreases the emissions of greenhouse gases and contributes to global warming. However, this paper sets out to explain why we may expect exporters to emit less, and why trade liberalization may thus lead to a cleaner industrial production. This is done by focusing on inter-rm productivity dierentials and interdependence among productivity, exporting, abatement and environmental emissions.
The empirical literature that analyzes the link between trade in goods and emissions based on sector-level data and Heckscher Ohlin type models is also inconclusive. This paper proposes a detailed mechanism for why exporting rms, which are subject to an environmental tax, may have a lower emission intensity. Our point of departure is the Melitz (2003) model with heterogeneous rms and intra-industry trade. Our mechanism runs through rms' endogenous investments in abatement. Firms' abatement investments depend on their production volumes, as a larger scale allows them to spread the xed costs of abatement investment across more units. Production volumes increase in rm productivity and, as a consequence, rms' emission intensity is negatively related to rm productivity. 1 See early surveys by Copeland and Taylor (2004) and Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) .
Exporting also leads to higher production volumes and thereby to a lower emission intensity.
Thus, trade has an eect on emissions independently of rm productivity. Our model also predicts that abatement as well as abatement intensity (abatement per output) increase in trade. These properties of the model are supported by Swedish rm-level data.
Our theoretical model also allows for predictions of the impact of trade liberalization on aggregate environmental emissions. Trade aects the exporting and non-exporting sector in dierent ways. For any level of trade costs, exporters are always cleaner than non-exporters, and we show that trade liberalization makes exporters even cleaner by inducing them to invest more in abatement. But trade liberalization also implies higher production volumes for exporters, which ceteris paribus entails higher emissions. Therefore, there is an increase in total emissions from the exporting sector. However, trade also increases local competition, which implies that the least productive, which are also the dirtiest, rms are forced to close down, while the remaining non-exporters are forced to scale down their production volume.
Together, these dierent eects of trade liberalization serve to decrease total emissions from the non-exporting sector. In our benchmark case of symmetric countries, these eects cancel out, and the overall eect of trade liberalization on emisssions is neutral. That is, aggregate emissions are not aected by trade liberalization. This result is shown to hold in numerical simulations also when the countries are of dierent size but otherwise symmetric.
We also numerically simulate a case where countries have dierent emission taxes. Firms are drawn to the low tax economy when trade is liberalized, as predicted by the pollution haven hypothesis, but the low tax economy is also an attractive platform for exporting and rms invest in abatement as they become exporters. We nd that the increased abatement investments can be strong enough to decrease global emissions. Thus, we have an antipollution haven case. This is not the only possible outcome, but it is interesting that trade liberalization can lead to lower global emissions under these circumstances, and it may be one of the mechanisms that make it hard to establish an empirical relationship between trade and emissions.
Our theory is related to the idea presented in Levinson (2009) that trade may contribute to reduced pollution since trade liberalization encourages technological upgrading. From a more methodological point of view, our work is also related to the literature on heterogeneous rms and trade induced technological upgrading, see e.g. Bas (2012) and Bustos (2012) . Our model is also related to a couple of papers that analyze how rms in a closed economy invest in abatement technology to reduce pollution. Naturally, these do not analyze the relationship between trade and emissions, which is our main interest. Anouliès (2017) analyzes the eects of dierent policy designs of a cap-and-trade program in a closed economy Melitz model with abatement. Tang et al. (2014) examine the impact of environmental policy within a framework of heterogeneous rms in a closed economy. They nd that environmental policy reduces both consumption and pollution emission, but that output could be maintained using subsidies directed towards the more productive rms. Cao et al. (2016) analyze a closed economy using a version of the Melitz Ottaviano (2008) model of heterogeneous rms.
As in our paper, rms invest in abatement technology to reduce pollution. Their main nding is that there is a hump-shaped relationship between productivity and abatement investments. Our model does instead produce a positive association between productivity and abatement investments and a negative relationship between productivity and abatement intensity (abatement/output), which is consistent with Swedish data. variety. Their model imposes that rm-level emissions decrease in rm-level productivity with a constant elasticity of emissions w.r.t. productivity. The eect of trade liberalization on aggregate emissions hinges on this elasticity, and aggregate emissions may decrease if the elasticity is high enough. Our paper instead models rm-level emissions as the outcome of endogenous rm-level investments in abatement, and our most central results concern the eect of trade on rm-level emissions and abatement investments. In our framework, trade has an independent eect on rm-level abatement investments, and thereby on emissions.
We also nd supportive evidence of this using Swedish rm-level data.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section presents descriptive evidence on emission intensity, abatement and abatement intensity among non-exporters and exporters relying on data for Swedish manufacturing rms. Motivated by the descriptive evidence, Section 3 develops a theoretical model on international trade, environmental emissions and heterogeneous rms. Based on this model, we are able to derive a set of propositions and empirical implications regarding emissions, abatement and trade that are in line with the descriptive evidence. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
Descriptive evidence on COemissions
Our model has the property that more productive rms are cleaner since they nd it profitable to make larger xed investments in clean technology. Second, the model shows that exporters are cleaner for a given productivity level, since exporting implies a larger scale of production which motivates a larger xed investment in clean technology. In this section, we illustrate that these properties of the model are largely consistent with Swedish manufacturing census data. This data contains information at the rm level for a large number of variables. Firms' productivity is measured by total factor productivity, and is calculated from estimates of productivity functions using the method by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) . The energy statistics include all types of fuel use, from which CO2 emissions (kg) can be calculated by using fuel-specic CO2 emission coecients provided by Statistics Sweden.
CO2 emissions are accurately calculated from fuel inputs since a technology for capturing CO2 at the pipe is not yet operational. 3 The calculated plant-level emissions are aggregated to the rm level, which we match with the census data. This gives over 3000 observations each year. 4 We also have access to rm-level data on abatement over the same period. The abatement data is collected based on an annual survey where rms are asked about abatement investments (tSEK) for dierent purposes including clean air, which we use. Firms are asked to report any investment in machines and equipment specically aimed at reducing emissions, but also to report expenses related to investment in cleaner machines and technology. In the latter case, they are specically asked to report the extra expenses related to the choice of investing in cleaner relative to less clean machines and technology. The abatement 2 Production functions are estimated at the two-digit sector level, where we use value added as the measure of rm output. Explanatory variables are labor (measured by the wage bill) and capital. Finally we use raw materials as proxy for contemporaneous productivity shocks. All variables are in logs. 3 A few large power plants are experimenting with capturing CO2 below ground, but as we are focusing on manufacturing, these are not included in our data. 4 Note that as the census provides data for all rms, limiting the number to rms with at least one employee, we start with a number of 37745 rms for the period 2004-2011. However, due to the fact that energy statistics are only collected for plants with 10 or more employees, this reduces our sample by close to 30 percent. data is based on a semi-random sample of manufacturing rms, and includes all manufacturing rms with more than 250 employees, 50 percent of the rms with 100-249 employees, and 20 percent of the rms with 50-99 employees. In total, around 1500 manufacturing rms are surveyed over the time period 2004-2011. Dropping missing observations, we end up with around 600 rms each year. Table 1 shows how rm-level CO2 emissions per output vary with productivity and with being an exporter. To account for sectorial variations in emissions, we include industry dummies based on ve-digit industries, while year dummies pick up time trends. Finally, we also include a rm-level xed eect. We report regression results where errors are clustered at the rm level, while noting that clustering at the sector level gives very similar results.
Columns (1) to (4) in the table show that more productive rms are cleaner (have lower CO2 emissions per output), and that exporters are cleaner also after controlling for productivity, which is an important property of our model. The export dummy has the expected sign but is insignicant in column (5), where rm xed eects are used. This regression identies the eect of the export dummy solely on rms that change export status, which is about 25 percent of the rms in our sample. We here have the problem that many of these small rms change back and forth between exporting and not over the sample period, which may explain the low signicance in this case. Note: Errors are clustered at the rm level.*** signicant at the 1% level, ** signicant at the 5% level, *signicant at the 10% level. Note: Errors are clustered at the rm level. *** signicant at the 1% level, ** signicant at the 5% level, *signicant at the 10% level.
Exporters in our model are cleaner because they invest more in abatement (clean air technology). Table 2 shows that this is very well in line with the data. As explained above, this sample consists of larger rms that are to a very large degree exporters (150 out of 4694 are non-exporters). The table shows that exporters invest more in abatement and they do so also after controlling for productivity, i.e., trade has an eect on abatement investments that is independent of productivity. The eect survives when we use rm xed eects in column (5). Note: Errors are clustered at the rm level. *** signicant at the 1% level, ** signicant at the 5% level, *signicant at the 10% level.
Finally, in Table 3 we turn to abatement investments per output. Our theoretical results are driven by scale economies in abatement. Larger rms invest more in abatement, but it is not obvious that they will invest more per output in the presence of scale economies in abatement. Our model actually predicts that more productive rms will invest less per output, whereas exporting increases abatement investments per output. The coecients on productivity are negative and signicant and the coecients for the export dummy are positive and signicant in all cases except when we use rm level xed eects.
The Model
We develop a two-country model with international trade and heterogeneous rms based on Melitz (2003) , where rms' production entails environmental emissions. Due to environmental regulation, these emissions are subject to taxation. Firms are either productive enough to set up production and make positive prots or they exit the market right away. If they stay, they make two distinct decisions: (i) whether or not to enter the export market, and (ii) how much to invest in abatement to reduce emissions. There is a crucial dierence between the export and the abatement decision. If a rm decides to export, it has to incur a market entry cost that is constant and identical across all rms. In contrast, rms' abatement investments are endogenous and rm specic. As we will show, the optimal abatement investment turns out to depend on rm productivity as well as on whether or not the rm is exporting.
We consider the case of two countries, Home and F oreign, and let the latter be denoted by an asterix(*). The countries are identical with respect to technology and consumer preferences. Each economy is active in the production in two industries: a monopolistic competitive industry (M ) where rms produce dierentiated goods under increasing returns and subject to environmental emissions, and a perfectly competitive industry (A) which produces homogeneous goods subject to constant returns to scale. To make things simple, we shall assume that there is just one factor of production. This may be a composite factor but, for the sake of simplicity, we shall refer to it as labor. The supply of labor in each country is xed, but the size of countries may dier. (We will impose symmetric labor supplies from section 3.7 and onwards.) We present the equations describing Home s consumers and rms, and note that the corresponding equations apply to F oreign.
Demand
Consumer preferences are given by a two-tier utility function with the upper tier (CobbDouglas) determining the representative consumer's division of expenditure between goods produced in sectors A and M , and the second tier (CES) representing the consumer's preferences over the continuum of dierentiated varieties produced within the manufacturing sector. In addition, we assume that consumers are hurt by global environmental emissions (E W ), and how much a representative consumer is hurt by a given level of emissions depends on g(E W ). Consequently, consumer preferences can be described by the utility function
where µ ∈ (0, 1), and C A ,C M constitute the consumption of the homogeneous good and the dierentiated good, respectively. The function g(E W ) measures the disutility associated with emissions, and it is assumed that g (E W ) > 0. Goods produced in the A sector can be costlessly traded internationally and are produced under constant returns to scale and perfect competition. We assume that the demand for A goods is suciently large to guarantee that the A sector is active in both countries. The A-good is chosen as the numeraire, and the world market price of the agricultural good, p A , is thus equal to unity. By choice of scale, the labor requirement in the A-sector is one, which gives
and thus, wages are equal to one across both countries and sectors. Consumer preferences over goods from the M sector are represented byC M , which is an aggregate over a continuum of varieties indexed by i:
where c(i) represents consumption of each variety with elasticity of substitution between any pair of dierentiated goods being σ > 1. The measure of the set I represents the mass of varieties consumed in each country. Each consumer spends a share µ of his income on goods from industry M , and the demand for each single variety produced locally and in the foreign country is, respectively, given by
where p i is the price of variety i, L is income, and P is the price index of M goods. P is given by
M −goods that are produced in F oreign (H ome) and sold in Home (F oreign) incur an iceberg trade cost τ . For each unit of a good that is exported from one country, τ > 1 units must be shipped for one unit to arrive in the other country.
Entry, Exit and Production Costs
There is a large pool of prospective entrants to industry M . To enter the M industry in country j, a rm i bears the xed costs of entry f E measured in labor units. After having sunk f E , an entrant draws a labor-per-unit-output coecient a i from a cumulative distribution G(a). We follow Helpman et al. (2004) in assuming the probability distribution to be a Pareto distribution,
k is the shape parameter of the distribution, and we normalize the scale parameter to unity, a 0 = 1. Since a i is the unit labor requirement of rm i, 1/a i depicts the labor productivity of the rm. Upon observing its draw, a rm may decide to exit and not produce. If it chooses to stay, it bears the additional xed overhead cost f D . If the rm does not only want to serve the domestic market but also wants to export, it has to bear the additional xed cost f X . Both are constant across rms. Hence, rm technology is represented by a cost function that exhibits a variable cost and a xed overhead cost. In the absence of emissions and abatement investment, labor is used as a linear function of output according to
with f = f D for rms only serving the domestic market and f = f D + f X for exporters.
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The industrial activity in industry M entails pollution in terms of environmental emissions. These emissions are subject to taxation and a rm thus has an incentive to reduce emissions. For the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that the tax income arising from taxing emissions goes to an outside public good. In the modeling of emissions, we follow Copeland and Taylor (2003) and assume that each rm i produces two outputs: an industrial good (x i ) and emissions (e i ). In order to reduce emissions, a rm can divert a fraction θ i of the primary factor, labor, away from the production of x i . We consider θ i as a variable abatement cost that is chosen by each rm in order to maximize prots. The joint production of industrial goods and emissions is given by
with 0 ≤ θ i < 1. Emissions depend on the activity level as well as the rm's abatement eorts. The abatement function Our modeling of the abatement function, in particular the introduction of both a variable and a xed abatement cost, is novel. It is inspired by survey information on Swedish manufacturing industries that reveals the structure of the abatement costs of Swedish rms.
To our knowledge, we are the rst to model abatement in a way that closely mirrors the rms' actual abatement technology. As we will show, the modeling of abatement is essential for the relationship between trade and abatement and thus, for the predictions of trade liberalization and environmental emissions.
We proceed by using (10) to substitute for ϕ in (9), which can then be solved for (1 − θ i ), and, in turn, be used to substitute for (1−θ i ) in (8) . This gives us an integrated expression for the joint production of goods and emission, which exploits the fact that although pollution is an output, it can equivalently also be treated as an input:
Hence, with such an interpretation, production implies the use of labor as well as emissions.
The model is based on an underlying assumption of an imperfect substitutability between labor and emissions. The parameter α denotes how intensive the industry M is in the use of labor versus the use of emissions. A dirty industry will thus be characterized by a high α.
Note that while rms are heterogeneous with respect to labor productivity and abatement, they are identical with respect to the structure of their basic production technology.
Firms minimize their costs subject to the production function (11), taking wages (w = 1) and emission taxes (t > 0) as given. Disregarding the sunk entry cost, we can derive rms' total cost function using (7) and (11) . Our analysis focuses on steady-state equilibria and intertemporal discounting is ignored.
The present value of rms is kept nite by assuming that rms face a constant Poisson hazard rate δ of death independently of productivity. An entering rm with productivity a i will immediately exit if its prot level π (a i ) is negative, or will produce and earn π (a i ) ≥ 0 in every period until it is hit by a bad shock and forced to exit.
Pricing and prot
Having drawn their productivity, rms follow a two-step decision process. We solve their problem using backward induction: First, rms calculate their optimal pricing rule given investments in local production facilities (f D ), export facilities (f X ) and abatement (f A i ).
Second, they make their decision on rm-specic abatement investment, given the optimal pricing rule. Implicitly, they then also decide on the emission intensity and the share of the input factor to divert away from production and towards abatement, i.e. the variable 7 See Copeland and Taylor (2003) for a discussion of this feature of the model. abatement eorts. At the second stage, they also decide on whether or not to export. As will become clear, the decisions on export and abatement investment are intertwined.
Each producer operates under increasing returns to scale at the plant level, and in line with Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , we assume there to be a large group monopolistic competition between the producers in the M sector. Thus, the perceived elasticity of demand equals the elasticity of substitution between any pair of dierentiated goods and is equal to σ. Each rm sets a price equal to a markup over marginal costs, which yields a pricing rule
for each producer. Using (12) and (13), we can formulate the expression for rms' prots.
Super-and subscript D and X denote non-exporters and exporters, respectively. Firms only serving the domestic market will earn prots
while the exporting rms, serving both the local and the foreign market, will earn prots
where B ≡
in an index of the market potential of the home country, B * ≡
depicts the market potential of the foreign country and φ ≡ τ 1−σ ∈ 0, 1] depicts the freeness of trade.
Cut o Conditions
Upon entry with a low-productivity draw, a rm may decide to immediately exit and not produce. If it faces a high productivity draw and decides to stay, it may just serve the domestic market or it may choose to serve the foreign market as well. The cut-o conditions determine whether or not a rm decides to stay in the market and whether it decides to become an exporter. Firms' abatement investments aect production, marginal costs and prots and also the cut-o conditions. Abatement investments thereby have an impact on the protability of being a domestic versus an exporting rm.
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The cut-o productivity level for rms only serving the domestic market (1/a D ) identies 8 In this sense, our model is related to the literature on trade-induced technological upgrading. See e.g. Bas (2008) and Bustos (2011) . the lowest productivity level of producing rms. From (14) and (15), we see that prots are increasing in rms' productivity. Firms with a productivity below 1/a D expect negative prots and therefore exit the industry. The point at which prots from domestic sales equal zero is determined by
Since σ > 1 and 0 < α < 1, it follows that a (1−α)(1−σ) increases along with productivity and can thus be used as a productivity index. From (16) , it follows that the cut-o productivity a D depends on the domestic market potential, the domestic xed costs, taxes and abatement investment. f D A depicts the abatement investment undertaken by the non-exporter with cuto level productivity.
The cut-o productivity level for exporters (a X ) identies the lowest productivity level of exporting rms, and is given by the productivity level where the export prots plus the potential net extra prot in the home market from higher abatement investments equal the extra xed costs incurred by exporting and the incremental investment in abatement:
where f X A is the abatement investment chosen by the exporter with exporter cut-o level productivity. The model is closed by the free-entry condition
Abatement Investment
In order to be able to derive an explicit analytical expression for abatement investments, we employ the specic functional form h (f A ) = f ρ A , with ρ > 0. From (14) and (15), it follows that rms' export decision will be decisive for rms' abatement investment and vice versa.
Maximizing non-exporting rms' prots with respect to abatement investments f Ai using (14) gives:
with β ≡ 1 − αρ(σ − 1) > 0 and γ ≡ (1 − α) (σ − 1) > 0. We note that β > 0 does not follow from the assumptions on parameter values, but from the condition for prot maximization, see Section A.1 in the Appendix. The optimal investment in abatement for exporters is similarly found by maximizing exporting rms' prot (15) with respect to abatement investment:
From (19) and (20), we see that the optimal abatement investment is rm specic and depends on the exogenously given rm-specic marginal productivity. Higher productivity means higher abatement investments. Hence, we can formulate the following propositions on the relationship between abatement investments, productivity and exporting: Proposition 1. More productive rms invest more in abatement.
Proof. The statement follows directly from (19) and (20) .
The logic behind this result is that more productive rms have higher sales. Hence, the exploiting of scale economies makes it protable for them to invest more in abatement in order to reduce the marginal costs.
Proposition 2. For any given level of productivity, exporters would invest more in abatement than non-exporters.
Proof. Since For any given level of productivity, exporters invest more in abatement since the abatement investment is correlated with the rm's market potential. Thus, trade has an independent eect on abatement, and e.g. a higher foreign market potential B * would increase a rm's abatement investments given productivity.
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Optimal abatement investments depend on taxes. The direct impact of the tax rate seen from expressions (19) and (20) is possibly not quite intuitive. But the eect of taxes on abatement investments also runs through the impact of taxes on a rm's competitors and thus on the rm's market potential B. If the rm's competitors face a higher tax rate, then ceteris paribus this encourages the rm to invest more in abatement. Due to the twofold eect of taxes on a rm's abatement investment, the net eect of taxes on abatement investments is in general ambiguous. It follows from the expressions for the market potential (B), the price index (P ) and the price (p i ) that with symmetric countries and tax rates (a case we explore in section 3.7), the direct and indirect eect of the tax rate cancel each other out. As a result, in the symmetric case, the abatement investments will be independent of the emission tax rate, while the abatement intensity increases. Note also that variable abatement increases in the tax rate as we show below.
Fixed versus Variable Abatement Costs Fixed abatement investments constitute a central and novel feature of our model. It is instructive to compare how the variable abatement cost and the xed abatement investment react to changes in the rm's environment.
Using (8) and (9) and Shepard's lemma on the cost function allows us to calculate the variable abatement costs as being the share of labor that is dedicated to variable abatement
This expression leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Variable abatement costs measured in terms of the share of labor diverted away from the production of good x, increases in rm productivity and in the tax rate, and decreases in the rm's xed abatement investment.
Proof. The statement follows directly from (21).
Hence, higher productivity leads to increased output but also to more resources being directed towards abatement both in terms of variable abatement costs and xed abatement costs, and a tax increase encourages increased variable abatement costs. We also observe that there is a substitution between the two types of abatement costs. A higher xed abatement investment leads to lower variable abatement eorts. Finally, we observe that while trade costs have a direct impact on xed abatement investment, there is no impact of trade costs on variable abatement eorts. Hence, for trade liberalization to aect abatement eorts, environmental abatement must be characterized by economies of scale at the rm level.
Environmental Emissions
A rms' choice of emissions will depend on the relative price of emissions versus labor and its abatement investments. The general expression for emission intensity is found by using Shepard's lemma on the cost function (12):
10 Note that emissions implied by transportation are accounted for in the analysis due to how they are modeled. Iceberg transportation costs imply that transportation costs are incurred in terms of the good transported, and emissions related to the production of the quantity that is absorbed by transportation are thus accounted for in all expressions of emissions and emission intensity of exporters.
To explore the relationship between emission intensity and rm characteristics, we proceed by deriving the emission intensity of an exporter and a non-exporter, respectively. We substitute (19) and (20) 
We see that rms' participation in trade aects their investment in abatement and therefore their emission intensity, measured as emissions relative to output. A set of results on the relationship between emission intensity, productivity and trade emerges directly from equations (23) and (24):
Proposition 4. More productive rms have a lower emission intensity.
Proof. The statement follows directly from equations (23) and (24).
Proposition 5. For any given level of productivity, an exporter would have a lower emission intensity than a non-exporter.
Proof. The statement follows from the cut-o conditions for exporters and non-exporters, expressions (23) and (24) , and the fact that (B + φB * )
More productive rms have a lower emission intensity, both due to a higher eciency in their use of inputs and due to their higher investments in abatement (see Proposition 1).
Hence, in the absence of endogenous investments in abatement (ρ = 0 or f Ai = f A ), more productive rms still have a lower emission intensity.
Since exporters are more productive than non-exporters, it follows that exporters will have a lower emission intensity than non-exporters. However, without endogenous abatement investments, the dierence in emission intensity between exporters and non-exporter is purely driven by the productivity dierences between the rms per se, and is unrelated to trade.
Once we assume endogenous investments in abatement, trade has direct implications for abatement and emission intensity. Independent of rm productivity, the increased production scale implied by exporting leads to higher abatement investments (see (19) and (20)) and a lower emission intensity.
Trade Liberalization, Abatement and Emissions
We will now turn to the eects of lower variable trade costs (higherφ).
11 In order to analyze the eects of incremental trade liberalization, we need to solve the model completely, and therefore now assume the two economies to be symmetric. Due to symmetry, it sufces to solve for equilibrium in Home. Emission taxes are xed and identical in the two economies. Using equations (19) , (20), (16) 
with β ≡ 1 − αρ(σ − 1), β ∈ (0, 1), and γ ≡ (1 − α)(σ − 1) > 0. Note that if production does not entail any emissions and we accordingly assume α = 0, the equilibrium expressions 14 We also assume that kβ > γ, which guarantees that the cut-o productivities are positive.
15 From (25) and (26) , it follows that trade liberalization will make the domestic cut-o condition tougher, i.e. a D decreases, while the exporter cut-o condition becomes softer, i.e. a X increases, as trade liberalization allows the entry of new rms into the export market. These results are in line with the results in the standard Melitz model.
By solving for the price index in the symmetric case, and using (25) and (26), we can derive the equilibrium number of rms in Home (being identical to the number of rms in foreign), which will matter for total emissions in equilibrium:
11 It is also possible to think of trade liberalization as a lower market entry cost, f X . However, lower variable trade costs (a higher φ) and lower f X turns out to have qualitatively the same eects on our model, and we therefore here focus on variable trade cots. 12 See Appendix Section A.4 for details on calculation. 13 For a comparison of equilibrium cut o conditions, see Baldwin and Forslid (2010) who derive explicit expressions for the standard Melitz (2003) model cut-o conditions for the symmetric case without emissions. 14 The corresponding condition in the standard Melitz model is
15 The condition may be written: . (27) It follows from (27) that as is standard in the Melitz model, the number of rms in Home and, by symmetry, in F oreign, decreases as trade is liberalized.
Trade Liberalization and Abatement Investments
We start by examining the impact of trade liberalization on abatement investments. For this purpose, we derive explicit expressions for rms' abatement investments in the symmetric case. We proceed by using (16) and substitute for the cut-o productivity for non-exporters determined by (25) to back out B. Using the explicit expression for B and the fact that B = B * in the symmetric case, we substitute into (19) and (20), and derive the abatement investments for non-exporters (f D A ) and exporters (f X A ) for the symmetric equilibrium:
Based on (28) and (29), we can now formulate the following proposition on the eect of trade liberalization on abatement investments: Proposition 6. Trade liberalization (higher φ) will always decrease non-exporting rms' abatement investments, and it will increase exporters' abatement investments i γ kβ
Proof. It follows directly from (28) that trade liberalization leads to reduced abatement investments among non-exporters, while the condition for exporters is derived in Appendix A.2.
Trade liberalization increases the competition for all rms. This eect is most easily seen in the rst part of equations (28) and (29) where the ratio a i a D falls as trade liberalization leads to a higher a D . This eect leads to a lower scale of production and lower abatement investments among all rms. However, for exporters, trade liberalization also means improved market access to the foreign market and increased export sales. This is reected by the term (29) . The net impact of trade liberalization on existing exporters is positive only if the competition eect is weaker than the eect of improved market access. Finally, trade liberalization also induces some rms to switch from non-exporting to exporting, and this increases the abatement investments of these rms by the factor (1 + φ)
Using (16) and substituting for the cut o productivity for non-exporters determined by (25) to back out B, the demand equations (4), and (28) and (29) give the abatement intensity of non-exporters,
, and exporters,
This leads to the following propositions:
Proposition 7. Trade liberalization (higher φ) will increase the xed abatement intensity of both exporters and non-exporters, but the increase is sharper for exporters.
Proof. The proposition follows directly from (30) and (31) since β < 1.
Proposition 8. More productive rms have a lower xed abatement intensity.
Proof. The proposition follows directly from (30) and (31) .
Trade liberalization implies a higher xed abatement intensity for all rms, but a higher productivity actually leads to a lower abatement intensity. That is, more productive rms invest more in abatement, as revealed by (28) and (29), but abatement investments as a share of output decline in productivity.
Trade Liberalization and Emission Intensity
Having established the eects of trade liberalization on abatement investments, we now turn to the eect of trade liberalization on emission intensity in the symmetric case. We use the general expression for emission intensity in (22) and substitute for f D Ai and f X Ai using (28) and (29). This gives us the emission intensity for non-exporters ( e D i x i ) and exporters (
We start by pointing out that absent xed abatement investments, i. Analyzing abatement investment, we found that in the symmetric case, the eects of taxes cancel each other out and taxes do therefore not have any impact on abatement investments, but they do aect rms' emission intensity as seen in (32) and (33) . This result is due to the fact that an increase in the emission tax makes emissions more expensive and encourages the rm to increase its variable abatement eorts. As a consequence, both exporters' and non-exporters' emission intensity are reduced if the tax rate goes up.
Trade Liberalization and Aggregate Emissions
It remains to investigate whether trade liberalization reduces or increases aggregate emission volumes. Trade liberalization aects individual rms' emission intensity, their production volumes, the number of rms and the productivity cut-o levels. Adding up these eects, we are able to determine the eect of trade liberalization on global emissions. We start by examining the eect of trade liberalization on individual rms' emissions. We proceed, using (23), (24), (4) and the solution for B to calculate emissions for non-exporters and exporters:
Comparing these to (28) and (29) reveals that rms' emissions are proportional to rms' abatement investments. As is the case for abatement investments, we have that trade liberalization reduces each non-exporter's emissions, which is driven by reduced output among non-exporters due to increased competition. Hence, a lower volume more than compensates for an increased emission intensity among these rms.
Exporters' individual emission volumes are aected by trade liberalization through two channels: Trade reduces the emission intensity while at the same time increasing sales volumes. It is also noteworthy from (34) and (35) that higher productivity rms have ceteris paribus higher emissions due to the higher production volume of these rms.
16 B is calculated in Appendix A.4.
In order to derive the impact of trade liberalization on total global emissions, wenally need to take in account the eect of trade liberalization on rm demography. Trade liberalization is known to cause the exit of the least productive non-exporters while also allowing the most productive non-exporters to enter into exporting. Aggregate emissions by non-exporters and exporters in Home (and, by symmetry, in F oreign) are given by the
and
Solving these integrals conditional upon rm entry gives the expressions for total emissions of non-exporters and exporters in each country, respectively.
17 Aggregate emissions of non-exporters are given by
Trade liberalization decreases the total emissions of non-exporting rms. This follows directly from (38), given the underlying assumptions that kβ > γ. Trade liberalization reduces the number of non-exporters. Moreover, those that are weeded out are the least productive and thus the dirtiest rms. Together with lower production and emission volumes for the remaining non-exporters, this implies that trade liberalization reduces total emissions by non-exporters, despite the fact that non-exporters decrease their abatement investments and increase their emission intensities.
Aggregate emissions by exporters are given by
On a general basis, the eect of trade liberalization on aggregate emissions of exporters looks ambiguous, but adding aggregate emissions by exporters and non-exporters gives a clear cut-answer. Global emissions are given by:
17 See the supplementary guide to calculations.
where In order to illustrate the dierent eects behind this result, we follow Anouliès (2017) and Cherniwchan et al. (2017) and use (23), (24), (36) and (37) to decompose the eect of trade liberalization on aggregate emissions from one of the symmetric countries:
where i ≡ e i x i is the emission intensity of rm i. The rst term shows the negative eect on the extensive margin where the mass of rms declines due to increased competition. The second and third term show the technology eect. The emission intensity of non-exporters increases as these rms decrease their abatement investments when import competition becomes harder. Exporters, in contrast, increase abatement investments when exporting becomes easier and this reduces their emission intensity. The opposite pattern holds for the scale eect illustrated in terms four and ve. Here exporters increase their production while non-exporters scale down. The last two terms show how the selection eects in the Melitz framework lead to lower emissions. Increased competition due to trade liberalization means that dirty, low productive rms are forced out of the market, da D dφ < 0, which decreases emissions. Finally, trade liberalization implies that some rms change status from non-exporters to exporters. This eect decreases emissions since a rm of a given productivity invests more in abatement when it becomes an exporter, e X (a X ) < e D (a X ),
We next turn to a numerical illustration of the eects of trade liberalization on emissions in our model. Figure 1 18 shows a typical case of how emissions by exporters and non-exporters 18 The gure is based on the parameter values:
evolve in response to trade liberalization. The rise in the total emissions of exporters is fully compensated by the decrease in emissions by non-exporters, which means that global emissions are constant. This conclusion holds also when countries are of dierent size as long as everything else is symmetric. Figure 2 shows a case where all parameter values are the same as in Figure 1 except that L > L * .
19 In this case, trade liberalization leads to a concentration of rms in the larger home country because of the so-called home-marketeect. A larger market is ceteris paribus more attractive since it allows a rm to economize on (iceberg) transport costs. However, competition increases in the large market as more rms concentrate here, and location is determined by the balance of these forces. Trade liberalization makes it easier to serve the other market via export and this will lead more rms to locate in the larger market. While Figure 1 still applies for aggregate global emissions from exporters and non-exporters, the distribution of emissions between the two countries changes. Figure 2 shows how the relocation of rms to the larger country implies higher emissions in this country and lower emissions in the other country, while global emissions remain constant.
Contrary to e.g. 
An anti-pollution haven hypothesis
We here turn to simulating the eect of trade liberalization when the home country has lower environmental taxes, t < t * .
20 This is a case that is potentially problematic from an environmental point of view, since lower trade costs make it easier for rms to concentrate production in the low tax location and serve the world market from here. Figure 3 shows how rms indeed concentrate in the low tax economy in a relative sense, while at the same time the number (mass) of rms is reduced as competition increases due to trade liberalization. Together, this leads to falling global emissions as seen in Figure 5 .
Several forces are, as discussed, at work, but the dominating eect relates to rms switching to exporting, particularly in Home, which leads to lower emissions. This eect is so strong 
Conclusion
This paper develops a two-country model of heterogeneous rms that invest in abatement to lower the environmental emissions. The model proposes a mechanism for why exporters may have lower emission intensities than non-exporters. Firms' abatement investments depend on their production volumes, as a larger scale allows them to spread the xed costs of abatement investment across more units. Exporting leads to higher production volumes and thereby to a lower emission intensity. This implies that exporting has an eect on emissions that is independent of rm productivity, and the model suggests that trade has a positive eect on rms' abatement intensity (abatement per output). We show that these eects are in accordance with Swedish rm-level data.
Solving the model for symmetric countries, we nd that trade liberalization allows for a higher production volume and makes exporters cleaner as they are induced to invest more in abatement. But trade liberalization also makes non-exporters dirtier as these rms are forced to downsize and reduce their investments in abatement. Reallocation eects do add to this. Trade liberalization implies increased competition and forces the most dirty non- 21 The anti-pollution haven case is reversed, for the parameter values used here, when the xed cost of exporting in the low tax country is about 16 percent higher than in the high tax country. exporters out of the market, while it also softens the threshold for exporting, allowing rms with ceteris paribus lower productivity and higher emission intensity to enter into exports.
As it turns out, these eects cancel out when countries are symmetric (except for size), and aggregate emissions are therefore unaected by trade liberalization.
Finally, we simulate a case where one country has lower emission taxes, but where trade liberalization nevertheless leads to lower global emissions. Thus, we have an anti-pollution haven eect. The reason for this eect is that rms in the low cost economy have an advantage in the export market, and when rms in this market switch to exporting, they increase their investments in abatement.
Our paper proposes a mechanism of how technology upgrading makes exporting rms cleaner. We also show that this eect can be strong enough to overturn the pollution haven hypothesis. Thus, our paper proposes one reason why the empirical literature has found it dicult to establish that trade liberalization leads to higher emissions.
A Appendix

A.1 Optimal Abatement and Productivity Level
The optimal level of abatement investments is given by:
(42) We dierentiate the optimal abatement level with respect to the productivity level:
We observe that abatement investments are increasing in rms' productivity level, provided
i.e. for β > 0. However, we assume that this condition will always hold, since it is a necessary condition for prot maximization
This implies that abatement has a decreasing marginal eect on rms' prot.
A.2 Condition for
Taking logs and dierentiating and simplifying gives
The sign of this expression is positive when
which can be reformulated as
Dierentiation of (33) w.r.t. φ and simplifying gives
The sign of this expression depends on the term
in the numerator given that kβ γ > 1, 0 < φ < 1, and 0 < β < 1. Rearranging this term gives
Thus, we have that
A.4 NOT FOR PUBLICATION, Solving for Symmetric countries
Assume symmetric taxes and labor supply (L) so that B = B * .
A.4.1 Cut-o productivities
Optimal abatement investments are derived in Section 3.5 in the main text:
is exogenous to the rm. Now calculate relative abatement investments:
The cut-o conditions are found in the main text text in Section 3.4 and are given by:
Simplifying and rewriting (54) gives us an expression for B as a function of a D and t:
where κ ≡
Next we substitute (49) and (50) into (53) to get
, which we can simplify and rewrite so as to get B as a function of a x and t:
Using (55) and (57) gives the relative cut-o condition ratio:
Next solve the free-entry condition
Using (19) and (20) to substitute, we get
Solving the integral, we get
and substituting in the solutions for B, (55) and (57):
A.4.2 Calculate the price index (P )
We now calculate the price index for the symmetric case. We have that B ≡
which can be rewritten as
and substituting in for a k D using (63) gives the price index
A.4.3 Calculating the number of rms in the symmetric case (n = n * )
The price of an individual variety of a non-exporter is given by (from the main text):
After substituting inf D A from (19), we get the non-export price
The price of exporters is derived in the same fashion 
